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 This short paper aims to contribute to the debate on the causes and 
remedies for high rates of unemployment and under-employment, which 
presently afflict large parts of both the North (industrial countries) and the 
South (developing countries).  The starting point for the paper is a recent 
interesting and thoughtful examination of these questions by Isabelle 
Grunberg (1996).  As against the emphasis on labour market flexibility and 
the concept of NAIRU, which dominate the mainstream theoretical 
discussions, as well as policy prescriptions for the global unemployment 
problem, Grunberg provides an unorthodox analysis.  She regards failure on 
the demand side to be the main cause of unemployment and considers a 
range of structural factors connected with the increasing integration of the 
world economy (in terms of trade, finance and investment) which inhibit 
demand growth. 
 
The present author broadly agrees with Grunberg's general approach.  
This paper supplements her analysis by examining further some of the main 
themes presented in her contribution.  Specifically, the paper will comment 
on the following issues: 
 
(a) The differences in the nature of the employment challenge which 
confronts industrial and developing countries. 
(b)The question of "jobless growth" and the effects of technical 
change on employment and unemployment. 
(c) The impact of globalisation and liberalisation on the rate of growth 
of demand in the world economy. 
 
The paper provides inter alia an analysis of the chief constraints on 
the demand as well as the supply side which may affect the long-term growth 
of output and employment in industrial and developing countries. 
 
 
 
The employment challenge: North and South 
 
The main stylised facts about unemployment, under-employment and 
related phenomena in developed and developing economies may be 
summarised as follows.  
 
1. There has been a large trend increase in unemployment rates in 
most industrial countries since 1973.  In 1970 there were 8 million people 
unemployed in OECD countries; in 1994 the unemployed numbered 35 
million, about 10% of the labour force.   The rise in unemployment has been 
particularly marked in the case of West European countries.  West Germany 
provides a striking example of this.  It is a remarkable fact that between 1964 
and 1973 the average rate of unemployment in West Germany was less than 
1% of the labour force.  The corresponding unemployment rate for the last 
ten years (i.e. 1986-1995) has been over 8% of the labour force.    
 
2. In addition to these high recorded rates of unemployment, a 
considerable proportion of the workforce in advanced economies is presently 
obliged to work part-time, or is too discouraged by the lack of employment 
opportunities to look for work at all.  If these involuntary part time and 
discouraged workers are included, it is estimated that this would raise the 
OECD unemployment rate by half as much (OECD (1994)). 
 
3. Unemployment rates have been appreciably lower in the U.S. than 
in Western Europe.  Between 1964 and 1973, the U.S. unemployment rate 
averaged 4.5%. During the last ten years (1986 to 1995), it has been higher 
(6.4%), but not as high as in Western Europe.   
 
 Despite this superior U.S. performance relative to Western Europe 
in relation to open unemployment, the U.S. nevertheless has a large army of 
underemployed people.  Thurow (1996, p.56) observes: 
 
 “There are 8.1 million American workers in temporary jobs, 2 
million who work ‘on call’ and 8.3 million self-employed ‘independent 
contractors’ (many of whom are down-sized professionals who have very 
few clients but call themselves self-employed consultants because they are 
too proud to admit that they are unemployed).  Most of these more than 18 
million people are looking for more work and better jobs.  Together these 
contingent workers account for 14 percent of the workforce.” 
 
 Moreover,  the average real wage for non-supervisory workers in 
the U.S. declined at a rate of 0.3% per annum in the 1970s, 1.0% per annum 
in the 1980s and 0.3% per annum between 1990 to 1994.  In contrast in the 
1960s, the corresponding average real wage rose at a rate of 1.4% per annum 
(Pollin & Zahrt, 1996).  
 
 Further, in addition to the huge underemployment and stationary or 
declining real wages, another unfavourable aspect of the labour market 
experience in the U.S. in the recent period has been the growing inequality of 
wages.  Wage dispersion had decreased in the U.S. during the 1950s and 
1960s but wages have become much more unequal during the last two 
decades.  Wage dispersion has also greatly increased in the UK over the last 
fifteen years.  However in continental Western Europe there has been very 
little change in the recent period. 
 
4. The unemployment challenge facing developing countries today is 
somewhat different from that which confronts the advanced countries. Since 
in developing countries, there is hardly any public provision or welfare 
payments for those who become unemployed, most people in these countries 
are obliged to seek work, howsoever unremunerative it may be.  
Consequently, the recorded rates of unemployment in developing countries 
tend to be generally low.  This may be illustrated by the case of Mexico. 
Mexico, although still a developing country, joined the OECD - the rich 
countries’ club - in the wake of the euphoria following its entry into NAFTA. 
At a time of large scale unemployment in industrial countries, it turns out 
that the country with one of the lowest unemployment rates in the OECD is 
Mexico - its recorded unemployment rate was 2.9 percent in 1992, 3.5 
percent in 1993 and 3.7 per cent in 1994 compared with double digit rates in 
several European economies.  
 The employment problem in the South thus manifests itself primarily 
in the forms of underemployment and low productivity/low remuneration work, 
often called ‘disguised unemployment’, following Joan Robinson. More 
significantly, however, the labour force in the two developing continents with 
the most acute employment difficulties, namely Latin America and Africa, is 
presently increasing at a rate of approximately 3% per annum.  The employment 
challenge before these countries is therefore not only to reduce the existing large 
disguised unemployment, but also to provide adequately remunerative jobs for 
the rapidly growing new entrants to the labour force.  {PRIVATE } 
 
5. Since the 1980’s, there has also been differences in the experiences of  
Asian countries on the one hand,  and Latin American and African countries on 
the other hand.  Between 1980 and 1992 paid employment in Latin American 
countries, for example, fell at a rate of 0.1% per annum (ILO, 1995).  This 
reversed the trend of the previous three decades, which had witnessed a 
significant expansion of modern sector employment. Again, the case of Mexico 
provides a good illustration. Between 1990 and 1992, the economically active 
population (EAP) in that country is estimated to have increased by 1.2 million 
persons each year. However, during this period only 339,974 jobs, i.e. 28 per 
cent of the EAP, was absorbed by the formal labour market. Yet it is important 
to observe that in the two years before the debt crisis, 1980 and 1981, the 
Mexican economy was expanding at an average rate of about seven per cent per 
annum and creating almost three quarters of a million new jobs each year in the 
formal sector.1 
 
 In sharp contrast to these serious employment difficulties of the 
African and Latin American economies, there has been a fast expansion of 
formal sector employment in East and South East Asian countries. In a number 
of these countries (e.g. Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia), manufacturing employment 
increased during the 1980s at a rate of almost 6% per annum.  These previous 
labour-surplus economies have found themselves with significant labour 
shortages, leading to considerable immigration of labour force from 
neighbouring lower income countries.   
 
 
III. GROWTH OF OUTPUT, EMPLOYMENT AND REAL DEMAND 
 
How can these unfavourable developments in the labour markets in the 
North and in large parts of the South be explained? 
 
The key variable here is the growth of GDP.  The outstanding record of 
near full employment in industrial countries for nearly a quarter of a century up 
to 1973 arose from the very fast growth of these economies during that period. 
In this aptly named golden age of capitalist development, GDP in industrial 
countries expanded at a historically unprecedented rate of nearly 5% per 
annum.2 This rate was almost twice as high as any of the trend rates experienced 
by these economies during their previous phases of development over the last 
150 years.3 However, since 1973 the GDP growth rate in OECD economies has 
fallen to approximately half of what it was during the 1950s and 60s, resulting 
in the observed high rates of unemployment or under-employment. Similarly, 
the reason for the superior employment performance of East Asian countries 
relative to those in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa lies in the much 
faster rate of growth of the former group of economies since 1980.  The East 
Asian countries have expanded at an average rate of nearly 8% per annum 
compared with average growth rates of 2 - 3% in the Latin American and 
African countries during this recent period.4 [see Table 1]. 
 
 
                                                          
     1See Singh (1988) and Peters (1994). 
     2See further Glyn et al (1990); Kindelberger (1994); Singh (1995); Crafts and Toniolo (1996). 
     3  Maddison (1982) 
     4For a comparative analysis of economic development of developing countries in different regions 
see further Singh (1993, 1994a, 1995a); World Bank (1991, 1993), among others. 
It is sometimes argued that economic growth no longer results in the 
expansion of employment.  However there is little empirical support for this 
proposition at the macro-economic level in either industrial or developing 
countries.  The data for industrial countries in fact shows that the growth rate 
required before the economy starts creating net new jobs has been less in the 
period 1974 to 1995 than during 1960 to 1973.  This reflects the lower average 
productivity growth of the later period.5  Further, cross-section econometric 
evidence for advanced industrial countries suggests, if anything, an increase 
over time in the employment elasticity of output growth rather than a decrease, 
as the hypothesis of jobless growth would imply.6  The reason why 
unemployment or under-employment has increased so steeply in all these 
countries  is not that ‘growth’ does not create as many jobs as before, but that 
there has been much slower growth than before. 
 
Thus, a comparison of the record of growth of output, employment and 
earnings in the golden age with that observed for these variables in the 
subsequent period for the advanced industrial countries strongly suggests that 
with sufficiently fast economic growth, countries can achieve both full 
employment and rising real wages.  This is as true of the U.S. as of the West 
European countries.  The available cross-section evidence for developing 
countries for the period since 1980 also unambiguously points in the same 
direction. As chart 1 shows, the faster the economic growth in a developing 
region during the 1980s, the faster was the growth of manufacturing 
employment. Moreover, with fast economic growth, the East and South East 
Asian countries not only achieved fast growth of formal sector employment 
during the 1980s, the real wages in these countries rose at a rate of 5% per 
annum.  The Latin American and African countries not only had a decline in 
modern sector employment, but also suffered reduced and stagnant real wages 
(this point is discussed further below). 
This brings us to the central question: can the growth rates of 
advanced industrial countries be raised to the levels required to attain full 
employment with rising real wages as was, for example, the case in the 
golden age?   Similarly, one can ask: can developing countries in Latin 
America and Sub-Saharan Africa achieve the growth rates which would be 
necessary to provide jobs to their fast-growing labour forces as well as 
reduce the large backlog of existing open and disguised unemployment?  The 
essential argument of this paper is that there is in principle an affirmative 
answer to each of these questions.  This argument will be elaborated in the 
next two sections by examining separately for advanced and developing 
                                                          
     5In the U.S., the annual growth rate required for the economy to start creating net additional jobs 
during 1960-1973 was 2.3%; between 1974-1995, the corresponding rate has only been 0.7%.  See 
further, ILO (1996). 
     6Boltho and Glyn (1995) report that employment elasticity of GDP growth for advanced industrial 
countries rose from 0.49% during 1975-82 to 0.63% during 1982-93. 
countries the various possible constraints on the demand as well as the 
supply side, which may be inimical to faster long-term economic growth . 
 
 
The Constraints on Faster Economic Growth: Advanced Economies 
 
The Record of the Golden Age: The Social Market Economy 
 
The first important point to note is that although the growth 
performance of advanced industrial countries in the period since 1973 is 
considerably inferior to that of the golden age, it is very much in line with the 
historical record of these economies.  That does not make the post-1973 
record legitimate or acceptable in view of the high degree of unemployment 
which presently exists.  Nevertheless it does suggest that it is the high growth 
rates of the golden age which are the exception, rather than the rates of the 
recent period. 
 
Why were the growth rates so high in the golden age?  Does that 
period of high employment and rapidly rising living standards have any 
implications for the contemporary situation in industrial countries?  As these 
questions have been examined at length elsewhere(see Singh, 1995) , it will 
suffice to summarise here the main points of the analysis. 
 
(1) The outstanding performance of industrial countries in the 
period 1950-73 was not an accident, or simply a favourable outcome of a 
chance combination of circumstances.  It derived from an economic model 
which was rather different from that which prevailed in the inter-war period 
or since the 1980s.   
 
(2) In descriptive macro-economic terms, the golden age was 
characterised by exceptionally high rates of growth of real demand and 
investment.  Aggregate real demand in industrial countries increased at a rate 
of nearly 5% per annum, compared for example with the post-1973 growth of 
this variable at about half that rate.  Similarly, during the golden age, capital 
stock and capital labour ratio in these countries recorded an unprecedented 
growth. These in turn generated high growth rates of productivity and output, 
justifying past investment and encouraging its continuation in a positive 
feedback loop. 
 
(3) At a deeper economic level, this high growth equilibrium 
of the golden age was sustained by new institutional arrangements - indeed a 
new economic system.  This system arose in Western European countries in 
the post-war period in response (a) to the mass unemployment of the Great 
Depression and equally importantly (b) the confrontation between alternative 
socio-economic orders (i.e. the communist party-led command economy of 
the former Soviet Union and the liberal capitalistic economic system of the 
U.S.).  This new social market economy was based on cooperative 
relationships between employees, employers and the government at the 
national level and between nation states at the international level. Within 
nations, it involved a social consensus, a national compromise over the 
distribution of income and the fruits of economic progress.  The central 
elements of this compromise were a commitment to full employment and a 
welfare state on the part of the employers and the government, and a 
corresponding commitment to wage moderation on the side of the 
employees.  At the international level, following the war, the world trade and 
financial system worked in a stable and predictable way under the hegemony 
of the U.S., the dominant economic power for most of this period. 
 
An analysis of the reasons for the fall of the golden age by the mid-
1970s and the emergence of a rather different economic system in the 1980s 
is provided by Glyn et al. (1990).   It suffices here to note that the new post-
1980 economic order, which has progressed most in the U.S. and the U.K., 
emphasises the supremacy of market forces; it eschews government 
regulation of labour, product or capital markets, as well as non-market 
cooperative relationships between governments, employees and employers 
such as ‘incomes policies’.  Similarly, at the international level, instead of 
cooperation between nation states, economic relationships are increasingly 
dominated by market forces unleashed by liberalisation and globalisation.  
The extent, if any, to which this new economic order constrains the current 
and potential growth of output in industrial countries will be examined later. 
 
Technology and Unemployment  
 
Turning to supply side constraints on GDP growth in industrial 
countries, the question of the nature and pace of technological change is 
clearly salient. There are two inter-related issues here : 
 
(a)  Is the pace of technical change now faster than before, and 
thus directly responsible for the observed increase in unemployment? 
 
(b) How does technical change affect the potential growth of 
output? 
  
The most important technical change of the post-war period is 
undoubtedly the information and communications technology revolution 
(ICT).  Many students of technology regard ICT to be on par with the 
previous major technical revolutions of the last two centuries such as the 
steam engine and electricity.   However, ICT differs from the latter two in 
one important respect.  In addition to being an input and facilitating 
production in a wide range of industries, the ICT also has direct outputs, in 
the form of new products - e.g. the Internet, CD-ROM, micro-processors, etc.  
Another important difference between ICT and electricity and steam power is 
that the pace of technical change in the former has been much faster with the 
result that its price has fallen far more quickly relative to the other two.  
Whereas it took almost fifty years for the price of electricity or of steam 
power to be halved after the beginning of their commercial use, the price of 
ICT has fallen to a fiftieth of what it was twenty-five years ago.  An ordinary 
PC today costing about $2,000 has as much computing power as the most 
advanced computer in 1975 costing at the time over $10 million (Woodall, 
1996). 
 
Nevertheless, despite its potential, the ICT has not resulted in a faster 
average growth of productivity in industrial economies.  The rate of 
productivity growth in the  OECD countries has been considerably lower in 
the period 1974-1995 than during the 1950s and 60s.  This outstanding fact 
has two major implications.  First of all, it suggests that the mass 
unemployment of the recent period cannot be blamed on technology.  The 
observed fall in productivity growth suggests a lower average rate of 
technical change rather than an increase.   A part of the paradox may well be 
due to the incorrect measurement of output and productivity in the recent 
period in the national accounting statistics as some economists, probably 
rightly, suggest.  However, an important part of the answer to this paradox of 
a huge new technical revolution and yet no increase in average productivity 
clearly lies in the fact that the potential of this technology is not yet being 
fully realised.  If the rate of growth of real aggregate demand was higher, this 
technology would have more widespread use in most branches of industry 
and services, reducing their prices and, as in the case of previous technical 
revolutions, leading to a virtuous circle of increased demand, increased 
output and increased growth of productivity.  In short, the unutilised 
potential of the ICT revolution suggests that the rate of growth of GDP in 
industrial countries is certainly not constrained by supply.  If there are 
constraints, it is to the factors on the demand side that we must turn. 
 
The Mainstream View: NAIRU and Flexible Labour Markets 
 
However, contrary to the above analysis, many mainstream 
economists normally insist that the chief constraints on employment and 
GDP growth in advanced economies lie on the supply rather than the demand 
side.   The most important argument made in this respect is that labour 
market inflexibilities constrain output and employment growth well before 
full employment is reached.  The formal analysis is conducted in terms of the 
concept of NAIRU, the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment.   
There are, however, many well-known difficulties with the NAIRU analysis, 
both at the empirical and analytical levels.  I simply note here that the labour 
market theories of unemployment and inflation cannot explain the long-term 
pattern in these variables in leading industrial countries.  To illustrate, the 
labour markets were much more flexible in the 1930s compared with the 
1960s, and yet the 1930s had mass unemployment (and low inflation) and the 
1960s had full employment and also low inflation.  Contrary to the NAIRU 
analysis, real product wages rose more in the 1960s than they did in the 
1930s and yet there was fuller employment in the later period than in the 
earlier one. 
  
The exponents of NAIRU set great store by the recent employment 
experiences of the U.S. and Western Europe.  It is argued that the main 
reason why the U.S. today has lower unemployment than Western Europe is 
because of its relatively much more flexible labour markets.  This argument, 
however, fails to take into account the fact that the U.S. had more flexible 
labour markets than Western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s as well.  In the 
earlier period, European countries enjoyed a far superior employment record 
to that of the U.S. 
 
As suggested before, the missing variable in the above analysis is the 
rate of growth of real demand and output.  The main reason for the superior 
employment record of the European countries in the golden age compared 
with either the interwar period or the 1980s, was the much faster growth of 
real demand and output in that period. 
 
The emphasis above, and indeed, throughout this paper, on real 
demand is deliberate.  It points to the fact that the "demand problem" today 
cannot simply be solved by normal expansionary monetary and fiscal policy. 
The post World War II economic history of industrial countries suggests that 
unless there is a restraining institutional mechanism with respect to wages 
and incomes, monetary and fiscal expansion will simply lead to an increase 
in money demand rather than real demand as the economy moves towards 
fuller employment on a sustained basis.  This suggests that a main constraint 
on the growth of real demand is an institutional one: the absence of income 
and wage coordination policies which were an important part of the golden 
age consensus. 
 
It might parenthetically be noted that although there is some common 
ground between the NAIRU analysis and that outlined above, there are also 
profound differences both with respect to the overall analytical perspective 
and policy conclusions.  Instead of recommending greater labour market 
flexibility in order to increase employment (through measures such as 
reducing trade union rights or cutting welfare state benefits), the present 
paper emphasises the role of the growth of real demand through non-market, 
co-operative and collective institutional mechanisms. 
 
Liberalisation, Globalisation and the Demand Constraint 
 
In addition to the absence of the domestic institutional mechanisms 
which can constrain real demand growth as outlined above, there are also 
today other important constraints on demand growth at the international 
level. The latter emanate from the liberalisation of national economies, and 
the globalisation of markets, which has occurred in the last 10 to 15 years.  A 
very important part of this process in the present context is the free 
movement of capital across the exchanges for most industrial countries and, 
increasingly, for many developing economies. 
 
In contemplating the shape of a liberal international economy in the 
post-war period, Keynes was most concerned with the problem of how the 
balance of payments disequilibria between nations may be resolved at a rate 
of growth of world demand which was adequate for full employment.  He 
noted that:  
 
 “the problem of maintaining equilibrium in the balance of 
payments between countries has never been solved... the failure to solve this 
problem has been a major cause of impoverishment and social discontent and 
even wars and revolutions ...to suppose that there exists some smoothly 
functioning automatic mechanism of adjustment which preserves equilibrium 
if only we trust matters of laissez faire is a doctrinaire delusion which 
disregards the lessons of historical experience without having behind it the 
support of sound theory.” (Moggridge, Vol. 25, pp.21-22) 
 
The Bretton Woods institutions were designed to cope with this 
problem.  During the golden age, notwithstanding their many weaknesses, 
these institutions, with active help from favourable US government policies 
(eg. the Marshall Plan), were able to ensure that balance of payments 
disequilibria were indeed resolved at high rates of growth.  However, 
following the demise of the Bretton Woods regime, the payments equilibria 
between countries under financial liberalisation has only been maintained at 
low rates of growth of real world demand.  In addition to this important 
factor, there are also other ways in which the current liberalised and 
globalised international economic regime can, and has, constrained aggregate 
demand.  
 
Firstly, individual industrial countries have been obliged by financial 
markets to follow generally restrictive economic policies, because 
expansionary policies are punished by the markets and become unviable. In 
the formation of average market opinion, far more weight is given to the 
perceived dangers of inflation rather than to the need to obtain full utilisation 
of resources. Eatwell (1995) outlines a process by which such market 
psychology becomes predominant. 
 
Secondly, unfettered capital movements provide enormous scope for 
destabilising speculation which in turn leads to high volatility of financial 
variables such as exchange rates and the nominal rate of interest. These in 
turn can affect real variables such as investment both directly and indirectly. 
Investment is discouraged directly by the rising cost of capital which is in 
part caused by volatility in financial variables. In addition, the greater overall 
uncertainty which now increasingly characterises the economic environment 
as well as the bigger fluctuations in almost all the components of final 
demand also have a negative effect on the corporate inducement to invest. 
The net result of all these factors is the observed low rates of growth of 
aggregate demand, output and employment.   
 
Labor Markets and Growth in Developing Countries 
 
Developing country labour markets 
 
Turning to developing countries, the first important point to note is 
that it would be difficult to explain the serious employment situation and the 
reductions in real wages in Latin American and African countries during the 
last 15 years in terms of the rigidities of their labour markets.  In static terms, 
there may well be many rigidities and imperfections in these markets, but it 
is important to appreciate that the experience of this period indicates that 
over time, these markets have responded well and quickly to economic 
changes.  Real wages, for example, fell by as much as fifty per cent in 
countries like Mexico during the economic downturn of the 1980s and rose 
somewhat in the subsequent upturn.  In other words, labour markets have 
been flexible in a dynamic sense. 
 
Moreover, aggregate cross-section data on real earnings and 
employment for the developing regions do not provide any support for the 
labour market theories of employment.  In Latin America and Sub-Saharan 
Africa there were enormous falls in real earnings in the 1980s: of the order of 
more than ten per cent per annum in Sub-Saharan Africa and over three per 
cent per annum in Latin America and the Caribbean (see Table 2). As seen 
earlier, these large reductions in real earnings did not, however, lead to an 
improvement in the employment situation, but rather to a deterioration. In 
contrast, in the East Asian countries, there was a phenomenal increase in real 
wages - at a rate of over 5 per cent per annum.  Yet this growth of earnings 
was accompanied, as noted before, by a large increase in modern sector 
employment.  In fact, in many of the East Asian countries, there were 
significant labour shortages which were met by immigration from abroad. 
 
The essential reason why both real wages and employment expanded 
in East Asia, whilst both fell in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, lies 
in the differences in the real rates of growth of aggregate demand and output 
for countries on the three continents.  The Latin American and African 
economies became severely balance-of-payments constrained during the 
1980s as a consequence of the debt crisis and therefore could maintain only 
low rates of growth of real aggregate demand and production.  The East 
Asian economies escaped the debt crisis and were thereby able to maintain 
their previous high rates of growth of real demand and GDP ( Singh, 
1993,1994a). 
 
Constraints on the South's economic growth 
 
The above analysis leads us finally to the question whether 
developing countries in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa can achieve 
in future the growth rates required to provide jobs to the new entrants to the 
labour force as well as reduce the current backlog of unemployment and 
under-employment.  Econometric studies suggest that in order to be able to 
employ a labour force which is growing at a rate of 3 per cent per annum, at 
the existing wage rates, a developing economy would have to grow at about 
6 per cent per annum. 
 
At one level, the answer to the question as to whether Latin American 
countries can achieve such growth rates is straightforward.  They have 
recorded such growth rates in the not too distant past -  between 1950 and 
1980. There is no reason at all why, at least on the supply side, they should 
not be able to achieve similar or higher growth rates in years to come.  
 
However, the situation is more complex.  In the recent period, the 
Latin American countries have been following the Washington Consensus 
and have been enthusiastically liberalising their economies.  They have 
unilaterally greatly reduced their tariffs and liberalised their financial 
regimes in order to attract foreign capital, which they duly did.  Spurred by 
the euphoria about the Washington Consensus and the emerging markets, as 
well as by other factors, Latin American countries received enormous 
inflows of funds between 1990 and 1994, largely from U.S. institutional 
investors.   These funds relaxed the foreign exchange constraint and enabled 
many Latin American countries to resume the process of real economic 
growth after the "lost decade" of the 1980s. 
 
As Rodrik (1994) and Krugman (1995) point out, however, these 
portfolio flows to Latin America were not responding to fundamentals but 
represented a misplaced euphoria and a 'herd' instinct.  The market was not 
rewarding virtue, frugality and restraint, but in many countries subsidising 
consumption at the expense of investment.  Despite evidence that countries 
like Mexico were running huge current account deficits and using inflows 
largely for current consumption, such flows continued.  The Mexican trade 
balance shifted from a small surplus in 1988 to a deficit of US $20 billion in 
1993; the current account deficit was about 6% of GDP in 1993 and 9% in 
1994.  Financial and trade liberalisation policies led to a fall in private 
savings from roughly 15% to 5% of GDP despite high interest rates (Taylor 
and Piper, 1996).  Notwithstanding huge capital inflows in the 1990s, 
Mexico's rate of economic growth during 1990-94 was only 2.5% p.a. - 
barely equal to the rate of population growth. 
 
The speculative bubble burst in December 1994, when portfolio flows to Mexico 
suddenly stopped. Share prices fell sharply, not only in Mexico but also, through the 
“contagion effect”, in most emerging markets. The impact on the real economy was 
devastating – real GDP fell by 7% in Mexico and by 5% in Argentina. Thus, even when 
financial markets have been expansionary, their bandwagon and herd characteristics 
generate considerable instability for the real economy.  
 
Consequently, under the Washington consensus policies, the real economy of 
Latin American countries expanded at a very low rate – 3 to 3.5 percent per annum – in 
the 1990s. Singh (1996) has suggested that the basic difficulty lies in the fact that the 
Latin American countries opened up too much and too suddenly to the international 
economy, both in the financial and product markets, so as to be able to sustain a desired 
current account position at the socially necessary growth rate of 6% or so per annum. 
Instead of a doctrinaire pursuit of more or less free trade and virtually unimpeded capital 
flows, Singh proposes a set of pragmatic policies to assist the Latin American real 
economy. These policies involve, inter alia, a considerable regulation of external capital 
flows, but also a relatively modest degree of control over imports. Unfettered capital 
markets and unrestricted trade liberalisation would not appear to represent the optimal 
degree of openness for most Latin American economies at the present juncture.  
 
Finally, unlike the Latin American economies, in the case of the African 
countries, supply side constraints on economic growth are more plausible. Although they 
are constrained by their balance of payment position (in turn attributable in considerable 
measure to low commodity prices), there are also in these countries serious supply side 
problems, not least those of governance and infrastructure. 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
The essential argument of this paper has been that unemployment in the North 
and in large parts of the South is due to a trend reduction in the rate of growth of output 
in these economies during the last two decades or so. The solution, therefore, must entail 
a restoration of economic growth in the North to its golden age levels, and growth in the 
Latin American countries to their long-term trend rates of 1950-1980. This should go a 
long way towards fully addressing the employment deficits in these economies on a 
sustained basis. Moreover, it is argued here that such growth is perfectly feasible on the 
supply side. Not only are there unutilized human resources, but also, significantly, there 
is a huge backlog of technology in the form of the information and communications 
technology revolution, whose full potentials are far from being realised. 
 
The central constraint on fast economic growth in the world economy is therefore 
not failure on the supply side, but on the demand side. To that extent, it is a self-inflicted 
wound, arising from the inefficiencies or the absence of the appropriate coordinating 
economic mechanisms. The paper suggests that in order to achieve the required rates of 
growth of real demand (to attain the desired output and employment objectives) deep 
institutional changes will be necessary, both at the national and international levels in the 
world community of nations.  
 
 These institutional changes are analysed and examined at length in Singh 
(1995).To summarize, what is required at the international level is for governments to 
agree to (a) give chief priority to the employment problem; (b) symmetrical adjustment in 
deficit and surplus countries; (c) macro-economic policy coordination, particulary 
between industrial countries via a multilateral mechanism. Originally this was the 
intended role of the IMF, instead of which it has mostly been used to discipline the 
South. 
 
 Parallel to these external coordinating mechanisms, and perhaps even more 
importantly, it is necessary to have appropriate mechanisms at the national level, to 
coordinate wage levels in  leading industrial countries – rather than the current policies  
which center around labour market flexibility and deregulation. Indeed, pay coordinating 
policies only work if they are not seen simply as mechanisms to reduce workers’ real 
wages to correct short-term macro-economic diseqilibria, but are regarded as long run 
measures leading to a fair and more progressive income distribution over time.  
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Table 1 
 
Trends in GDP growth: regions and the world 
1965-1994 
(Average annual percentage growth) 
 
 
 1965-1980 1980-1990 1990-1994 
Low-income economies 
(excluding China and India) 
 
4.8 
 
2.9 
 
1.4 
Middle-income economies 6.3 2.5 0.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa 6.0 1.6 3.6 
South Asia (including India) 4.2 2.1 0.9 
East Asia (including China) 7.3 7.8 9.4 
All low- and middle-income 
economies 
5.9 3.2 1.9 
High income economies 3.8 3.2 1.7 
   U.S. 2.7 3.3 2.5 
  Japan 6.6 4.0 1.2 
  Germany 3.3 1.9 1.1 
World 4.1 3.1 1.8 
  
Source: World Bank (1992, 1996). 
 
 
Table 2: Real earnings in manufacturing  
 
Region Years Average annual rate of 
growth (percentage) 
Sub-Saharan Africaa 1975-80 -0.6 
 1980-88 -12.3 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
1971-80 -2.13 
 1981-92 -3.13 
East and South East Asiab 1971-80 5.32 
 1981-90 5.12 
  Index manufacturing real 
earnings per employee 
(1987=100) 
South Asiac 1971 86.2 
 1980 87.4 
 1985 91.5 
 
Source: ILO (1995), ibid. 
 
                                                          
a Real annual earnings per employee in manufacturing, 1987 ($). 
b Comprises Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. 
c Comprises Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. 
 
